Israel vs. Egypt 70s(2)

·         Talks revolved around a small town Israelis occupied and used for farming, and Syria had previously used town as a regional military outlook.

·         After Kissinger threatens to walk out, both sides agree on the buffer zone with less Israeli troops present but still allowing Israelis to crop lightly, while Syria yielded to UN troops present around the town.

·         Syria refuses to stop sponsoring terrorist attack to the Palestininian organization(PLO). Israel wants all attacks to cease.

·         U.S. offers all attacks to stop and any attack would be seen as a violation of the agreement allowing Israel to respond without margin, also U.S. turns billion dollar loan for Syria into a grant and sends military equipment to sweeten offer.

·         On May 29, Israel and Syria signed their disengagement treaty under Kissinger’s watchful eye.

Israel and Egypt(2)

·         Tel Aviv accepted the Egyptian offer of a “ functional equivalent” to a peace treaty by pledging to solve all disputes by peaceful means.

·         Egypt offered its oil to Israel at world market prices, and Israel was allowed a voice in decisions relating to the UN troops ( particularly regarding their withdrawal, which in 1967 had been done unilaterally by Egypt).

·         Israel also agreed to withdraw completely from the passes and allow U. S. and UN inspection of its deployment on the ground.

·         Egypt explicitly ( and Israel implicitly) agreed to abide by this treaty for at least three years, subject to annual review, thus creating de facto the Geneva conference arrangement Kissinger had originally hoped for.

·         On September 1, 1975, the documents and corollary agreements were for-mally signed, and Kissinger was hailed as a miracle worker.

Jimmy Carter and talks between Israel and Egypt

·         Carter holds 13 day conference at camp david acting as mediator between the two states. Set

·         Egypt successfully negotiates the return of land taken by Israel.

·         Terms of agreement force Egypt to lose interests in Palestinian self determination.

·         2 years later, Israel wants to expand in a direct violation of agreement of 1978.

·         Carter flies to Egypt and Israel and acts as mediator again. Gets treaty from jews, goes to Egypt and Egypt accepts, flies back to Israel and is told that it would have to be approved by congress inorder for the Israeli leader to sign.

·         Treaty wanted carter to relocate American bases in Sinai, and provisions to compensate Israel for giving up Sinai oil. Also, outlined were steps to be taken if Egypt violated the treaty.

·         On March 26, 1979, then, the signatures were placed on the document and an ardu-ous process, begun by Henry Kissinger in 1973, was completed.

The PLO initiated the bloody “ intifadah” in 1987— a mass uprising that con-tinues to this day and in turn has spurred increased Israeli repression in the West Bank and Gaza. In 1988, the PLO renounced terrorism and quietly recognized Israel’s right to exist, thus allowing the United States to undertake direct talks with PLO representatives.

It was not until the Persian Gulf War in 1991 that major shifts occurred in Middle East political alignments.

·         During the war, many Arab countries sided with the United States and therefore implicitly with Israel. Israel also broke with prece-dent by not retaliating against Baghdad after repeated Scud missile attacks.

·         Within a year of the war, the United States and the Soviet Union, under the leadership of U. S. Secretary of State James Baker and Foreign Minister Eduard Scheverdnadze, organized a new multilateral Middle East peace conference amid skepticism, ambivalence, and only a modicum of hope.

·         The seating at the conference of a joint Jordanian– Palestinian delegation made possible the first direct talks between Israelis and Palestinians in forty- three years.

·          In spite of this historic breakthrough, however, the negotiations plodded along unsuccessfully for nearly two years.

·         Even the election in June 1992 of Yitzhak Shamir’s Labour Party— traditionally more flexible on the issues of land for peace and Palestinian rights— had little effect.

·         On August 31, 1993, in the eleventh round of what seemed to be almost point-less negotiations, Israel and the PLO announced a surprise. As a result of extended secret talks, they had concluded a deal that provided for mutual recognition and self- rule for Palestinians in parts of the West Bank and Gaza.

·          Within two weeks, Shamir and Arafat were shaking hands in front of the White House and American senators were dining with a former terrorist.

·         President Bill Clinton was quick to take credit, if only by virtue of his intentions, even though the Norwegian government had a more direct role in facilitating the secret talks by discreetly providing good offices.

·         More agreements signed in May and September of 1994 sealed the progress achieved. In October 1994, Jordan and Israel signed a peace agreement settling numerous outstanding issues.

What does this story tell us about the power of individuals and the levels of analysis approach generally?

·         It is clear that had Kissinger not applied his ample diplomatic skill to freeze the military stalemate in 1974, there would have been no reason for a peaceful settlement in 1979.

·         Likewise, without Anwar Sadat’s heroic initiative toward Israel, the peace process would not have occurred.

·         And finally, Jimmy Carter’s vision and tolerance were essential to the successful conclusion of the talks.

·         As predicted, strength of personality, crisis conditions, and substantial power and authority combined to increase the significance of the actors’ personali-ties in the outcomes.

·         The fact of the matter is that although personalities appear to have mattered, this was true only to an extent. They were also constrained by domestic politics and other conditions.

·         Futhermore, these actors functioned within an international context that was not of their creation.

·         It is clear that Jimmy Carter could not have performed his role had he presided over a country other than the United States.