Israel vs. Egypt 70s(1)

These actors and the forces that cause them to act make up what is known as the “ governmental level of analysis” and require serious attention on the part of any thorough scholar.

On the other hand, even the government exists within constraining institutions, known as the “ society.” This includes all those actors and factors that make up a coun-try’s society, character, history, and traditions.

Promoting polygamy, sponsoring terrorism, attacking Christianity, shutting down newspapers, and imprisoning political opponents generally don’t come to the minds of most government officials in the United States— contrary to those in some other places.

Finally, states, governments, and individual leaders operate within a global envi-ronment that is often very inflexible. The individual leader cannot relocate his or her country, suddenly make it a major ( or minor) power, sever ties with historic allies, or bomb the United Nations ( UN). Countries have certain roles to play in the inter-national system that stem from their capabilities, relationships, and the system of rules they inherit.

War of 1973 and Kissinger

·         Israel launches military effort to expand in 1967

·         Egypt, ousting its soviet influence, and Syria launch coordinated attack on Israel on Yom Kippur, jewish holiday, Oct. 6 1973.

·         Egypt reflected as arab nation and not as soviet surrogate.

·         Kissinger: Felt a stalemate during days of battle was best time to negotiate peace talks and cease fire.

·         Then, Egypt declines Israel’s reluctant offer at a ceasefire, Nixon sends airlift of supplies and food to Israeli troops.

·         Arab members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries ( OPEC) imposed an embargo on the export of oil to the United States, along with a unilateral quadrupling of crude oil prices.

·         The oil embargo intensified Kissinger’s efforts to reach a negotiated settlement of the war, and he sought the support of the Soviet Union.

·         On October 22, the UN Security Council Resolution 338, cosponsored by the two superpowers, demanded the immediate cessation of hostilities and the beginning of a peaceful settlement ( along the lines of a two- state solution called for in the UN Security Council Resolution 242).

·         The resolution did not stop the fighting.

·         The Soviet Union came close to intervening directly to support Egypt, but America’s warnings and a dramatic rise in its nuclear preparedness ( DEFCON) caused the Soviets to refrain.

·         The United States simultaneously exerted pressure on Israel to pull back from the Egyptian front to allow Egypt’s forces to be re- supplied. Israel was reluctant to agree, given the consider-able diplomatic leverage on Egypt this military posture commanded.

·         On November 7, while in Cairo, he secured the support of President Anwar Sadat of Egypt for a six- point pro-gram that provided for Third Army relief, prisoner exchange, and a future peace conference in Geneva.

·         This has been considered a major turning point in Egyptian policy because it was the first time Sadat was willing to accept something less than full Israeli withdrawal to the 1967 lines.

·         It was also the beginning of a break in the Arab alliance, although this outcome was more unin-tended than deliberate.

·          On November 9, Israel agreed to the plan after the United States gave assurances that it would monitor the re- supply effort for the Third Army.

·         Israel and Egypt were still far apart on two main issues: “ nonbelligerency” and exchange of prisoners.

·         Israel wanted peaceful relations while Egypt wanted to continue ties with other arab countries.

·         Egypt accepted exchange of prisoners as long as Israeli forces withdrew from suez canal.

·         Egypt was also involved in Palestinian self determination; Kissinger hoped to set problem aside not focusing on all enemies of the state of Israel.

·         Geneva convention met with little enthusiasm, U.S. military threat provided arab attentiveness.

·         “ shuttle diplomacy.” On January 12, while meeting with Sadat in Cairo, Kissinger accepted Sadat’s invitation to act as a go- between to Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir.

·         The arrangement suited all the parties: not only did it give Sadat a superpower in Egypt’s camp, but it also calmed Israeli fears that its concessions would make it more vulnerable.

·         The process of diplomacy led to a rather rapid reconciliation of the conflicting demands of the major parties.

What role did Kissinger play in these negotiations? According to Touval, he was able to induce concessions without resorting to pressures. The incentives that the United States offered— economic aid to Egypt and economic and military aid to Israel— do not appear to have been important causes for the parties’ flexibility either.

·         It was rather the pressure of the circumstances in which Egypt and Israel found them-selves that made them eager to conclude a disengagement agreement rapidly.

·         The mediator’s contribution was, however, essential in suggesting compromises and in arranging the indirect transaction of commitments.

·         This procedure helped to reduce Sadat’s vulnerability to criticism from the opponents of the agreement, which a direct commitment to Israel might have entailed.

·         And finally, by providing both parties with implicit and explicit guarantees, the mediator encouraged them to feel protected from some of the risks that they believed their concessions entailed.

Kissinger then attended talks between Israel and Syria.

·         When Kissinger promises Saudi Arabian King that he’s going to look out for Syrian interests, the oil sanction by the OPEC was removed.